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<title>Cogency. Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation</title>
<link href="https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/20337" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle>[0-9]{4}</subtitle>
<id>https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/20337</id>
<updated>2026-04-04T13:36:53Z</updated>
<dc:date>2026-04-04T13:36:53Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>How universal generalization works according to natural reason</title>
<link href="https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182027" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name/>
</author>
<id>https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182027</id>
<updated>2022-04-28T15:20:55Z</updated>
<summary type="text">How universal generalization works according to natural reason; How universal generalization works according to natural reason
Universal Generalization, if it is not the most poorly understood inference rule in natural deduction, then it is the least well explained or justified. The inference rule is, prima facie, quite ambitious: on the basis of a fact established of one thing, I may infer that the fact holds of every thing in the class to which the one belongs—a class which may contain indefinitely many things. How can such an inference be made with any confidence as to its validity or ability to preserve truth from premise to conclusion? My goal in this paper is to explain how Universal Generalization works in a way that makes sense of its ability to preserve truth. In doing so, I shall review common accounts of Universal Generalization and explain why they are inadequate or are explanatorily unsatisfying. Happily, my account makes no ontological or epistemological presumptions and therefore should be compatible with whichever ontological or epistemological schemes the reader prefers.; Universal Generalization, if it is not the most poorly understood inference rule in natural deduction, then it is the least well explained or justified. The inference rule is, prima facie, quite ambitious: on the basis of a fact established of one thing, I may infer that the fact holds of every thing in the class to which the one belongs—a class which may contain indefinitely many things. How can such an inference be made with any confidence as to its validity or ability to preserve truth from premise to conclusion? My goal in this paper is to explain how Universal Generalization works in a way that makes sense of its ability to preserve truth. In doing so, I shall review common accounts of Universal Generalization and explain why they are inadequate or are explanatorily unsatisfying. Happily, my account makes no ontological or epistemological presumptions and therefore should be compatible with whichever ontological or epistemological schemes the reader prefers.
</summary>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Towards the Definition of Logical Competence</title>
<link href="https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182028" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name/>
</author>
<id>https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182028</id>
<updated>2022-04-28T15:20:55Z</updated>
<summary type="text">Towards the Definition of Logical Competence; Towards the Definition of Logical Competence
According to logical psychologism that was popular in the nineteenth century, logic was regarded as a natural ability of human psychology. Consequently, logical competence as a realization of logic knowledge was treated as one of the innate features of human thinking. Nevertheless, within cognitive science, it was experimentally proved that our thinking is not free from cognitive biases, and to the same extent, our reasoning is not free from logical fallacies. Hence, we are forced to consciously clear the thinking of possible distortions to follow logical norms and to realize logical competence thereby. In the paper, it is shown that some cognitive biases are observed even at the level of cellular reactions to the environment and then at the level of animal behavior. Therefore not logic, but cognitive biases are a natural (biological) mechanism of human thinking. So, the problem of defining logical competence arises. In this paper, there are some arguments that logical competence has once appeared as an especial social practice and it has then been developed for a long time before the first treatises on logic.; According to logical psychologism that was popular in the nineteenth century, logic was regarded as a natural ability of human psychology. Consequently, logical competence as a realization of logic knowledge was treated as one of the innate features of human thinking. Nevertheless, within cognitive science, it was experimentally proved that our thinking is not free from cognitive biases, and to the same extent, our reasoning is not free from logical fallacies. Hence, we are forced to consciously clear the thinking of possible distortions to follow logical norms and to realize logical competence thereby. In the paper, it is shown that some cognitive biases are observed even at the level of cellular reactions to the environment and then at the level of animal behavior. Therefore not logic, but cognitive biases are a natural (biological) mechanism of human thinking. So, the problem of defining logical competence arises. In this paper, there are some arguments that logical competence has once appeared as an especial social practice and it has then been developed for a long time before the first treatises on logic.
</summary>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Pragmatics and mental architecture: a proposal from the massive modularity of the mind</title>
<link href="https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182029" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name/>
</author>
<id>https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182029</id>
<updated>2022-04-28T15:20:55Z</updated>
<summary type="text">Pragmatics and mental architecture: a proposal from the massive modularity of the mind; Pragmática y arquitectura mental: una propuesta desde la modularidad masiva de la mente
One of the fundamental problems with the cognitive nature of pragmatics concerns its place in the architecture of the mind. In this regard there are several proposals. One holds that part of the central systems within the framework of the theory of modular Jerry Fodor. However, Asa Kasher raises a hypothesis based on Fodor modulates architecture, but it gives a character to the modular least some aspects of pragmatic interpretation. In this work we argue that both proposals are incorrect due to inconsistencies with the empirical findings on pragmatic processing. Rather, we support a hypothesis based on the massive modularity of mind, where evolutionary considerations led to the emergence of a pragmatic sub-module that is part of a more general theory of mind module.; Uno de los problemas fundamentales respecto de la naturaleza cognitiva de la pragmática se refiere al lugar que ocupa ella en la arquitectura de la mente. Al respecto existen varias propuestas. Una de ellas sostiene que forma parte de los sistemas centrales en el marco de la teoría de modular de Jerry Fodor. Sin embargo, Asa Kasher plantea una hipótesis basada en la arquitectura modula de Fodor, pero sí otorga un carácter modular al menos a algunos aspectos de la interpretación pragmática. En este trabajo sostenemos que ambas propuestas son incorrectas debido a inconsistencias con los hallazgos empíricos sobre procesamiento pragmático. Por el contrario, se aboga por una hipótesis basada en la modularidad masiva de la mente, en donde consideraciones evolutivas llevaron a que emerja un submódulo pragmático que es parte de un módulo más general de teoría de la mente.
</summary>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>The role of abductive reasoning in legal evidentiary reasoning: a practice-oriented perspective</title>
<link href="https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182031" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name/>
</author>
<id>https://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/182031</id>
<updated>2022-04-28T15:20:55Z</updated>
<summary type="text">The role of abductive reasoning in legal evidentiary reasoning: a practice-oriented perspective; El rol del razonamiento abductivo en el razonamiento probatorio del derecho: una perspectiva orientada hacia la práctica
The article departs from an analysis and relativization of the sharp distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification, originated in the philosophy of science of logical empiricism, but present as a presupposition of several studies on legal argumentation. Next, it analyzes the proposal to develop a logic of discovery for the context discovery, one of whose main tools would be abductive reasoning. Finally, it applies the scope of such discussion to legal evidential reasoning, developing the analysis of some cases.; El presente artículo parte de una revisión y relativización de la tajante distinción entre contexto de descubrimiento y contexto de justificación, originada en la filosofía de la ciencia del empirismo lógico y presente como un presupuesto de varios estudios sobre la argumentación jurídica. A continuación, analiza la propuesta de desarrollar una lógica del descubrimiento para el contexto de descubrimiento, una de cuyas principales herramientas sería el razonamiento abductivo. Finalmente, aplica los alcances de tal discusión al razonamiento probatorio jurídico, a partir del análisis de algunos casos.
</summary>
</entry>
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