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dc.contributores-ES
dc.creatorSanhueza, Sebastián
dc.date2020-12-28
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-29T13:30:48Z
dc.date.available2021-01-29T13:30:48Z
dc.identifierhttps://sintesis.uai.cl/index.php/intusfilosofia/article/view/333
dc.identifier10.15691/0718-5448Vol3Iss2a333
dc.identifier.urihttps://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/164302
dc.descriptionIt is widely thought that, in his later work An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Bertrand Russell argued that our natural languages could in principle do away with indexicals. This brief piece, by contrast, aims to show that, instead of suggesting the potential eliminability of such expressions, Russell outlined a semantic account of indexicals according to which such expressions fundamentally depend on the perspectival way in which they refer to worldly items. If correct, this proposal would not only show that, in Russell’s later work, the meaning of expressions like indexicals is not exhaustively determined by the items they refer to: it would also show that Russell did not mean to eliminate indexicals from our natural languages at all.  es-ES
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Adolfo Ibáñez - Adolfo Ibáñez Universityes-ES
dc.relationhttps://sintesis.uai.cl/index.php/intusfilosofia/article/view/333/304
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2020 Sebastián Sanhuezaes-ES
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceSíntesis. Revista de Filosofía; Vol. 3, Núm. 2 (2020); 126-140es-ES
dc.source2452-4476
dc.source2452-4476
dc.subjectIndexicals; Bertrand Russell; Acquaint-ance; Causal Chains; Nameses-ES
dc.titleAre Russellian Indexicals Eliminable?es-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeen-US
dc.typees-ES


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