This describes the relationship in the Spinozian philosophy between the sign, on the one hand, and images, words and ideas, on the other; with the purpose of analyzing if the use of language in Spinoza is an obstacle or, on the contrary, enables the interpretation of his philosophical proposal. The problem with linguistic signs - words - in Spinoza's philosophy is that they are: (i) originated by impressions on the body and processed by imagination and therefore, (ii ) correspond to the first type of knowledge; while, from the semantic perspective, the signs are characterized by being univocal and confusing. Then it is worth asking, is it possible to obtain true ideas from language? Three interpretations are reviewed herein: (i) that of David Savan, who maintains the inadequacy of common language to express philosophical truths due to Spinoza's link between words and imagination. (Savan, 1972); (ii) that of G.H.R. Parkinson, according to which, the use of common language is not inconsistent with the expression of philosophical propositions made by Spinoza, but, on the contrary, most of what is proposed in Ethics belongs to the second kind of knowledge and is based on common notions (Parkinson, 1969) and; (iii) that of Mogens Laerke, who defends the possibility of attributing coherence to the use of language, on the one hand, and to Spinozian philosophy, on the other, based on the mathematical resource of geometric proof (Lærke, 2014). Finally, the author’s own interpretation is discussed; as it tries to reconcile these three interpretations, based on the semiotic analysis of the sign in Spinoza, from which: (i) it is possible to attribute to the sign a function within the understanding without detriment to their ability to reach philosophical truths and, therefore (ii) validate the use of language as a means of exposing their philosophy.Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía.