Duhem-Quine’s thesis provides plausibility for Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism by showing that the empirical refutation of a theoretical system is as chimerical as its verification. Grünbaum argues against this that such a thesis is untenable. They both agree in the formulation of Duhem’s argument as it was exposed by Quine. However, the exegesis carried out by Quinn, Laudan and Ariew makes it clear that it is a mistake to identify the Duhem-Quine thesis with the Duhem thesis. I argue that, if this is so, then a refutation that can be accepted as such only in retrospect is logically possible.La tesis de Duhem-Quine brinda plausibilidad al anarquismo metodológico de Feyerabend al mostrar que la refutación empírica de un sistema teórico es tan quimérica como su verificación. Frente a esto, Grünbaum argumenta que dicha tesis es insostenible. Ambos coinciden en la formulación del argumento de Duhem expuesto por Quine. Empero, la exégesis que, al respecto, realizan Quinn, Laudan y Ariew indica que constituye un error identificar la tesis de Duhem-Quine con la tesis de Duhem. Afirmo que, si es así, entonces esta última no excluye lógicamente la posibilidad de una refutación constatable como tal únicamente en retrospectiva.