Show simple item record

Intergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures: A game-theoretic approach

Intergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures: A game-theoretic approach

dc.creatorSanguinetti, Pablo
dc.date2016-05-04
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-05T18:33:08Z
dc.date.available2022-07-05T18:33:08Z
dc.identifierhttps://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40804
dc.identifier.urihttps://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/188903
dc.descriptionIt is well known that the fiscal performance of a country is actually determined by the interaction of may fiscal authorities within the public sector. The purpose of this paper is to present a simple model that adopts a game-theoretic point of view to investigate the consequences of different modes of interaction between federal and provincial jurisdictions for the determination of the overall public sector expenditures and taxes. We motivate the theoretical exercises presenting evidence regarding the fiscal performance of Argentina in 1970-1987 where an ill-designed system of intergovernmental grants has been associated with increasing provincial government deficits and of public sector expenditures.en-US
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherDepartamento de Economía - Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad de Chile.en-US
dc.relationhttps://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/40804/43757
dc.sourceEstudios de Economía; Vol. 21 No. 2 (1994): December; pp. 179-212en-US
dc.sourceEstudios de Economía; Vol. 21 Núm. 2 (1994): December; pp. 179-212es-ES
dc.source0718-5286
dc.source0304-2758
dc.titleIntergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures: A game-theoretic approachen-US
dc.titleIntergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures: A game-theoretic approaches-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record