The present work focuses on analyzing the challenge that the Constitutional Convention represents to regulate the right to compensation of innocent people wrongly convicted. In particular, two situations are studied on this matter that currently generate tension between, on the one hand, our Chilean domestic law, and, on the other hand, the American Convention on Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The two elements in tension referred to are: the non-existence of compensation for innocent people who have been sentenced by a sentence that cannot be classified as unjustifiably erroneous or arbitrary, and the partiality of the entity in charge of hearing compensation requests for who do have the right to request it. Each of these situations of normative tension are evils for which solutions have been tried to find within the legal framework of the current Constitution of 1980, always without success. For this reason, the creation of a new Constitution, which is the task that the Constituent Convention is currently working on, is a unique instance, although delicate due to its complexity, as demonstrated by the constitution of the year 1925.Este trabajo analiza el desafío que ha representado la regulación del derecho a indemnización de personas inocentes condenadas erróneamente para la Convención Constitucional. Se estudian dos situaciones que generan tensión entre el derecho chileno y la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos y el Pacto de Derechos Civiles y Políticos: la ausencia de indemnización para personas inocentes que han sido condenadas por una sentencia que no se puede catalogar de injustificadamente errónea o arbitraria, y la parcialidad de la institución a cargo de conocer las solicitudes de indemnización de quienes sí se les reconoce el derecho a solicitarla. Esta tensión normativa se ha intentado solucionar, en el marco jurídico de la Constitución de 1980, sin éxito. La creación de una nueva Constitución representa, por lo tanto, una oportunidad única para superar los déficits de la normativa actual, aunque como lo demostró la Constitución de 1925, es una tarea compleja.