In this paper, I vindicate a neglected account of structured propositions embraced by the young Moore and the young Russell, according to which propositions are structured non-representational chunks of reality composed of other non-representational chunks of reality. Firstly, I present the standard desiderata for propositions and the focus of my paper. Secondly, I discuss the standard account of structured propositions, which understands them to be complex representational entities of some sort. Thirdly, I go through the objections against that standard account of structured propositions and the reasons for considering propositions to be simple representational entities. Fourthly, I show how the neglected account of structured propositions that I vindicate can do the jobIn this paper, I vindicate a neglected account of structured propositions embraced by the young Moore and the young Russell, according to which propositions are structured non-representational chunks of reality composed of other non-representational chunks of reality. Firstly, I present the standard desiderata for propositions and the focus of my paper. Secondly, I discuss the standard account of structured propositions, which understands them to be complex representational entities of some sort. Thirdly, I go through the objections against that standard account of structured propositions and the reasons for considering propositions to be simple representational entities. Fourthly, I show how the neglected account of structured propositions that I vindicate can do the job