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dc.creatorEspinosa Ramirez, Rafael Salvador
dc.date2021-11-15
dc.date.accessioned2023-09-07T16:20:17Z
dc.date.available2023-09-07T16:20:17Z
dc.identifierhttps://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/778
dc.identifier.urihttps://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/233631
dc.descriptionIn an imperfect competition model of trade a domestic and foreign country establish a cooperative or non-cooperative subsidy schedule. The optimal subsidies are positive but different in size depending of the firm’s efficiency and the magnitude of the consumer market. After setting the subsidy, a fear shock in the domestic country caused by COVID-19 affects the domestic welfare depending on the subsidy schedule and firms’ efficiency. The effect of a fear shock in foreign country depends on his patter of trade. Finally, when fear shock affects negatively the welfare, the best policy response is to reduce the subsidy.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad Alberto Hurtado - Facultad de Economía y Negociosen-US
dc.relationhttps://www.rae-ear.org/index.php/rae/article/view/778/275275317
dc.sourceRevista de Análisis Económico ; Vol. 36 Núm. 2 (2021); 53-75es-ES
dc.sourceEconomic Analysis Review; Vol. 36 No. 2 (2021); 53-75en-US
dc.source0718-8870
dc.source0716-5927
dc.subjectfear externalityen-US
dc.subjectintegrated marketsen-US
dc.subjectsubsidyen-US
dc.subjectCOVID-19en-US
dc.subjectcooperative policiesen-US
dc.subjectemotionsen-US
dc.subjectcognitive biasen-US
dc.subjectconsumer decisionen-US
dc.subjectwelfare analysisen-US
dc.subjectinternational trade.en-US
dc.titleFear Shocks, Subsidies and Covid-19 In an Integrated Marketen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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