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Some Ruminations on Perfect Being Theism

Some Ruminations on Perfect Theism

dc.contributoren-US
dc.contributores-ES
dc.creatorResto Quiñones, Jashiel
dc.date2024-12-31
dc.date.accessioned2025-06-10T16:29:47Z
dc.date.available2025-06-10T16:29:47Z
dc.identifierhttps://sintesis.uai.cl/index.php/intusfilosofia/article/view/456
dc.identifier10.15691/0718-5448Vol7Iss2a456
dc.identifier.urihttps://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/254110
dc.descriptionAccording to Perfect Being Theism, God is the absolutely perfect (i.e., greatest possible) being. The notion of absolute perfection can be analyzed in different ways. On one interpretation, to be absolutely perfect requires the exemplification of all absolute perfections. On another interpretation, to be perfect requires the exemplification of the best possible combination of perfections. It seems that the latter analysis is better than the former, because it does not fall prey to the problem of incompatible perfections, viz., that there (probably) are perfections that cannot be coexemplified. Here I argue that even if perfect being theists accept the latter analysis, the problem of incompatibility does not go away. I argue that perfections are (probably) incomparable: it is false that some perfection is better than, worse than, or equally good to another perfection. If so, then it is impossible or at least extremely difficult to say that among the combination of perfections there are, there is one that is best among them. I also argue that adopting the former analysis with some restrictions (as Mark Murphy does) leads to the same incompatibility and incomparability problems.en-US
dc.descriptionAccording to Perfect Being Theism, God is the absolutely perfect (i.e., greatest possible) being. The notion of absolute perfection can be analyzed in different ways. On one interpretation, to be absolutely perfect requires the exemplification of all absolute perfections. On another interpretation, to be perfect requires the exemplification of the best possible combination of perfections. It seems that the latter analysis is better than the former, because it does not fall prey to the problem of incompatible perfections, viz., that there (probably) are perfections that cannot be coexemplified. Here I argue that even if perfect being theists accept the latter analysis, the problem of incompatibility does not go away. I argue that perfections are (probably) incomparable: it is false that some perfection is better than, worse than, or equally good to another perfection. If so, then it is impossible or at least extremely difficult to say that among the combination of perfections there are, there is one that is best among them. I also argue that adopting the former analysis with some restrictions (as Mark Murphy does) leads to the same incompatibility and incomparability problems.es-ES
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Adolfo Ibáñez - Adolfo Ibáñez Universityes-ES
dc.relationhttps://sintesis.uai.cl/index.php/intusfilosofia/article/view/456/425
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2024 Jashiel Resto Quiñoneses-ES
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceSíntesis. Revista de Filosofía; Vol. 7, Núm. 2 (2024); 60-83es-ES
dc.source2452-4476
dc.source2452-4476
dc.subjectPerfect Being Theism; Perfection; Incompatibility; Incomparability; Anselmianism.en-US
dc.subjectPerfect Being Theism; Perfection; Incompatibility; Incomparability; Anselmianismes-ES
dc.titleSome Ruminations on Perfect Being Theismen-US
dc.titleSome Ruminations on Perfect Theismes-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typees-ES


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