Reelection or term limits? The short and the long run view of economic policy

Streb, Jorge

dc.creator	Streb, Jorge
dc.date	2016-05-10
dc.date.accessioned	2019-04-02T13:58:54Z
dc.date.available	2019-04-02T13:58:54Z
dc.identifier	https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/41040
dc.identifier.uri	http://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/2861
dc.description	An incumbent's drive for reelection can lead to political budget cycles. The distortion cycles cause in economic policy may be offset by the information they indirectly provide about the incumbent's competency. The informative content of cycles depends on the sophistication of voters, i.e. on whether they are rational or near rational. In a framework of individual candidates, constitutional clauses that prohibit the reelection of the president eliminate political budget cycles. One-term limits that allow non-immediate reelection also shift the focus from short-run cycles to the long-run soundness of economic policies, and have superior welfare properties. Hence, the choice is not reelection or not, but rather immediate or non-immediate reelection.	en-US
dc.format	text/html
dc.language	eng
dc.publisher	Departamento de Economía - Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad de Chile.	en-US
dc.relation	https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/41040/43606
dc.source	Estudios de Economía; Vol 26 No 2 (1999): December; pp. 187-206	en-US
dc.source	Estudios de Economía; Vol 26 No 2 (1999): December; pp. 187-206	es-ES
dc.source	0718-5286
dc.source	0304-2758
dc.title	Reelection or term limits? The short and the long run view of economic policy	en-US
dc.title	Reelection or term limits? The short and the long run view of economic policy	es-ES
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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Estudios de Economía
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