Government discretionary transfers and overinsurance
Government discretionary transfers and overinsurance
| dc.creator | Forteza, Alvaro | |
| dc.date | 2016-05-10 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-02T14:00:08Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-04-02T14:00:08Z | |
| dc.identifier | https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/41034 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/3246 | |
| dc.description | Excess distortions in government transfer policies might result from the government lack of ability to commit not to help unlucky agents. Incentive considerations that are crucial in standard insurance in the presence of moral hazard play, no role in this case. A benevolent government that sets transfers after agents have chosen their effort faces a pure risk-sharing problem and provides full insurance, inducing too little effort. The lack of commitment ability might also cause indeterminacy: the economy might end in any of several equilibria, without the government being able to push it to a particular one. | en-US |
| dc.format | text/html | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Departamento de Economía - Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad de Chile. | en-US |
| dc.relation | https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/41034/43600 | |
| dc.source | Estudios de Economía; Vol 26 No 1 (1999): June; pp. 27-44 | en-US |
| dc.source | Estudios de Economía; Vol 26 No 1 (1999): June; pp. 27-44 | es-ES |
| dc.source | 0718-5286 | |
| dc.source | 0304-2758 | |
| dc.title | Government discretionary transfers and overinsurance | en-US |
| dc.title | Government discretionary transfers and overinsurance | es-ES |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
This item appears in the following Collection(s)
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Estudios de Economía
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