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Stakeholder Power in E-business Adoption with a Game Theory Perspective

dc.creatorRoberts,Barbara
dc.date2009-04-01
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-25T12:41:21Z
dc.date.available2019-04-25T12:41:21Z
dc.identifierhttps://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-18762009000100003
dc.identifier.urihttp://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/61066
dc.descriptionThe likelihood that one organization can pressure the e-business adoption practices of other organizations depends on two conditions: there must be sufficient power difference between the organizations; and the e-business process benefit must be sensitive to the number of adopters. Given these two conditions, the powerful organization can use their power advantage to control adopter numbers through urging or suppressing adoption by others. Examples from practice are provided, a theoretical framework capturing the three dimensional nature of e-business adoption influence is developed, and Game Theory is used to explore the range of possible outcomes when pressure to adopt is brought to bear between organizations of unequal power.
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageen
dc.publisherUniversidad de Talca
dc.relation10.4067/S0718-18762009000100003
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourceJournal of theoretical and applied electronic commerce research v.4 n.1 2009
dc.subjectStakeholder relationships
dc.subjecte-business adoption
dc.subjectStakeholder relationships
dc.subjecte-business adoption
dc.subjectPower relationships
dc.subjectGame Theory
dc.subjectPower relationships
dc.subjectGame Theory
dc.subjecte-Government
dc.titleStakeholder Power in E-business Adoption with a Game Theory Perspective


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