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dc.creatorDal Forno, Arianna
dc.creatorMerlone, Ugo
dc.date2009-05-01
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T12:36:39Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T12:36:39Z
dc.identifierhttp://revistas.ufro.cl/ojs/index.php/cubo/article/view/1469
dc.identifier.urihttp://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/84200
dc.descriptionA game where agents interact in small teams is proposed; the interaction is examined when the population consists of different types of agent and a rewardmechanism devised to increase competition is introduced. We prove that such a mechanism may expand the set of Nash equilibria and, in particular, reduce the production level of some agents. Finally, we extend our results to heterogeneous populations by means of agents based modeling. This way we can study the dynamics of adjustment of agents response and extend our results when considering local interaction and a egocentric knowledge of the population composition.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de La Frontera. Temuco, Chile.en-US
dc.relationhttp://revistas.ufro.cl/ojs/index.php/cubo/article/view/1469/1323
dc.sourceCUBO, A Mathematical Journal; Vol. 11 Núm. 2 (2009): CUBO, A Mathematical Journal; 15–36es-ES
dc.sourceCUBO, A Mathematical Journal; Vol 11 No 2 (2009): CUBO, A Mathematical Journal; 15–36en-US
dc.source0719-0646
dc.source0716-7776
dc.titleOptimal Effort in Heterogeneous Agents Population with Global and Local Interactionsen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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