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The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament

dc.creatorMukherjee, Arijit
dc.creatorWang, Leonard F.S.
dc.date2011-11-24
dc.identifierhttps://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art221
dc.identifier10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006
dc.descriptionIn a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherFacultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad Alberto Hurtadoen-US
dc.relationhttps://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art221/655
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2011 Journal of Technology Management & Innovationen-US
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0en-US
dc.sourceJournal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol. 6 No. 4 (2011); 73-79en-US
dc.sourceJournal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol. 6 Núm. 4 (2011); 73-79es-ES
dc.source0718-2724
dc.subjectR&D tournamenten-US
dc.subjectExcessive entryen-US
dc.subjectInsufficient entryen-US
dc.titleThe Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournamenten-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typeArtículo revisado por paresen-US


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