dc.creator | Mukherjee, Arijit | |
dc.creator | Wang, Leonard F.S. | |
dc.date | 2011-11-24 | |
dc.identifier | https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art221 | |
dc.identifier | 10.4067/S0718-27242011000400006 | |
dc.description | In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from excessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy. | en-US |
dc.format | application/pdf | |
dc.language | eng | |
dc.publisher | Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad Alberto Hurtado | en-US |
dc.relation | https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art221/655 | |
dc.rights | Copyright (c) 2011 Journal of Technology Management & Innovation | en-US |
dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0 | en-US |
dc.source | Journal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol. 6 No. 4 (2011); 73-79 | en-US |
dc.source | Journal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol. 6 Núm. 4 (2011); 73-79 | es-ES |
dc.source | 0718-2724 | |
dc.subject | R&D tournament | en-US |
dc.subject | Excessive entry | en-US |
dc.subject | Insufficient entry | en-US |
dc.title | The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament | en-US |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
dc.type | Artículo revisado por pares | en-US |