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dc.creatorAguilera,Bernardo
dc.date2016-12-01
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T14:23:27Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T14:23:27Z
dc.identifierhttps://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-23762016000200002
dc.identifier.urihttp://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/90428
dc.descriptionAccording to Fodor's informational approach, mental symbols have content by virtue of standing in certain nomic relations with their referents. These relations are sustained by computational mechanisms which enable the causal route linking mental symbols with the world. Fodor claims, however, that specifying the structure of those sustaining mechanisms is irrelevant for a theory of content. This paper argues that, on the contrary, without an account of the computational constraints under which those mechanisms operate, Fodor's theory is at best incomplete, and incapable of explaining what makes us the only known computing machine capable of bearing mental symbols so far.
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageen
dc.publisherUniversidad de Talca. Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos
dc.relation10.4067/S0718-23762016000200002
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourceUniversum (Talca) v.31 n.2 2016
dc.subjectInformational approach to content
dc.subjectcomputational theory of mind
dc.subjectmental symbols
dc.subjectreference
dc.subjectasymmetric dependence theory
dc.titleINFORMATION AND SUSTAINING MECHANISMS IN FODOR'S THEORY OF CONTENT


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