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dc.creatorBoeri,Marcelo D.
dc.creatorDe Brasi,Leandro
dc.date2017-07-01
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-03T14:23:28Z
dc.date.available2019-05-03T14:23:28Z
dc.identifierhttps://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-23762017000100017
dc.identifier.urihttp://revistaschilenas.uchile.cl/handle/2250/90445
dc.descriptionABSTRACT Knowledge of oneself is not easy to attain. Plato was aware of this and in this paper we aim to show that he suspected then, like psychologists know now, that one's introspective capacity to attain knowledge of oneself is very much restricted and that we must rely on the other as a source of such knowledge. We further argue that, for Plato, this knowledge is not easily achieved given not only the shortcomings of the first-person perspective but also the limitations of the third-person one.
dc.formattext/html
dc.languageen
dc.publisherUniversidad de Talca. Instituto de Estudios Humanísticos
dc.relation10.4067/S0718-23762017000100017
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourceUniversum (Talca) v.32 n.1 2017
dc.subjectKnowledge of the self
dc.subjectintrospection
dc.subjectself-ignorance
dc.subjectself-error
dc.subjectcognitive bias
dc.titleSELF-KNOWLEDGE IN THE ALCIBÍADES I, THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, AND THE THEAETETUS: THE LIMITS OF THE FIRST-PERSON AND THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVES


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