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Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model

Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model;
Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model

Author
Grimaldi, Gesualdo

Full text
https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art85
10.4067/S0718-27242008000100004
Abstract
This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society.
 
This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society.
 
This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society.
 
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Artes, Arquitectura y UrbanismoCiencias Agrarias, Forestales y VeterinariasCiencias Exactas y NaturalesCiencias SocialesDerechoEconomía y AdministraciónFilosofía y HumanidadesIngenieríaMedicinaMultidisciplinarias
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Universidad de ChileUniversidad Católica de ChileUniversidad de Santiago de ChileUniversidad de ConcepciónUniversidad Austral de ChileUniversidad Católica de ValparaísoUniversidad del Bio BioUniversidad de ValparaísoUniversidad Católica del Nortemore

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