Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model
Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model;
Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model
dc.creator | Grimaldi, Gesualdo | |
dc.date | 2008-10-02 | |
dc.identifier | https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art85 | |
dc.identifier | 10.4067/S0718-27242008000100004 | |
dc.description | This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society. | en-US |
dc.description | This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society. | es-ES |
dc.description | This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some inventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s behaviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer. So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society. | pt-BR |
dc.format | application/pdf | |
dc.language | eng | |
dc.publisher | Facultad de Economía y Negocios, Universidad Alberto Hurtado | en-US |
dc.relation | https://www.jotmi.org/index.php/GT/article/view/art85/445 | |
dc.rights | Copyright (c) 2008 Journal of Technology Management & Innovation | en-US |
dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0 | en-US |
dc.source | Journal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol. 3 No. 3 (2008); 33-44 | en-US |
dc.source | Journal of Technology Management & Innovation; Vol. 3 Núm. 3 (2008); 33-44 | es-ES |
dc.source | 0718-2724 | |
dc.subject | Errors | en-US |
dc.subject | Ideas | en-US |
dc.subject | Innovation | en-US |
dc.subject | Invention | en-US |
dc.subject | Knowledge | en-US |
dc.subject | Technology Transfer. | en-US |
dc.title | Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model | en-US |
dc.title | Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model | es-ES |
dc.title | Creating a “Market for Inventions”: A Referee Model | pt-BR |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | |
dc.type | Artículo revisado por pares | en-US |